EULEX a controversial mission

The EU mission to Kosovo (EULEX ), recently has faced many obstacles which are delaying its own deployment, foreseen by 15th of June. The EU's plan was to send a mission comprising 2,200 members to oversee the police and judiciary in Kosovo. The initial idea was for the mission to start operating by June 15th, when the new Kosovo Constitution will take effect. Unlike the UN, whose mission has been deployed since 1999, the EU intended to transfer most of its authority to Kosovo institutions and retaining jurisdiction over the judicial system and police.
According to EU representatives, disagreements on dividing responsibilities between the UN and EULEX could delay the deployment. EULEX is awaiting authorization to take over the country's police and judiciary, but objections from EU member states that have not recognized Kosovo's independence are stalling it, according to EU security chief Javier Solana.
In addition Russia has refused to accept the EU mission's deployment without Security Council approval; Serbia also opposes the deployment of EULEX, demanding that the mission obtain a UN mandate first.
Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic says: “Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs recognize only the UN mission and will not co-operate with EULEX. The objective of EULEX cannot be legalized in the UN, because that objective is the implementation of Kosovo's independence, whereas the UN's goal is to implement the essential autonomy of Kosovo. Those are two different goals that cannot be harmonized,"

Albania and Croatia road to NATO

The two countries have now formally begun accession talks to join the Alliance, as they were invited to during the Bucharest Summit on 2-4 April 2008.
Nevertheless the process to obtain the full membership foresees some other steps.
First of all the invited countries meet with a team of NATO experts on a number of sessions (generally two) to discuss and confirm their readiness to assume all of their obligations as new members of the Alliance.
NATO will then prepare accession protocols for each one of the invited countries. The protocols are amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty, which once signed and ratified by the Allies, will enable Albania and Croatia to become parties to the Treaty and members of NATO.
After the conclusion of the talks, the foreign ministers of Albania and Croatia will send a letter of intent to NATO confirming their interest, willingness and ability to join the Alliance. Together with the letters they submit a timetable for necessary reforms to be completed before and after accession in order to enhance their contribution to the Alliance.
With the reception of this letter, and the reply sent by NATO’s Secretary General, all requirements are met for the signature of the accession protocols, which has been scheduled for 9 July 2008.
Once the accession protocols are signed, they still have to be approved by all NATO member countries. This may be a time-consuming process as the 26 Allies have to ratify the protocols according to their national requirements and procedures.
When the ratification process will be completed, the NATO Secretary General will invite the prospective new members to become parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.In the meantime, Albania and Croatia will deposit their formal instruments of accession with the United States (the United States Department of State is the depository), and formally become parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and thus members of NATO.
At the end this will be the sixth round of enlargement in the Alliance's history. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia joined in 2004; the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999; Spain in 1982; Germany in 1955 and Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952.

Kosovo independence

KOSOVO celebrated its independence on last Sunday 17th February, becoming soon the seventh nation from the old Yugoslavia.
The unilateral declaration of independence defied the international law, which recognizes Kosovo as part of Serbia ( UN resolution n.1244); it was emboldened by the support of the US and most EU members ignoring the resistance of Serbia and its ally Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that the Kosovan move is a dangerous provocation that could lead Moscow to support breakaway movements in other "frozen conflicts" with its own neighbours such as Georgia and Moldova.
Mr. Putin said the western Europeans were being hypocrites by demanding independence for Kosovo but opposing the same treatment for other breakaway regions such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Trans-Dniester in Moldova.
Anyway Russia and Serbia have ruled out military responses to Kosovo's declaration, with Serbia saying it would stick to diplomatic and economic retaliation against any nation that recognizes Kosovo's independence.
The US, Britain and France have recognized Kosovo immediately, after them have followed Germany and Italy. EU is replacing the UN administration with its mission “EULEX”, which has overseen the territory for almost a decade.
Not all EU members are happy about supporting a unilateral declaration of independence, with Cyprus in particular fiercely opposed because it fears setting a precedent for its own Turkish-dominated northern region.
Fellow EU members Romania and Slovakia are expected to refuse to recognize Kosovo's independence and others, including Spain and Greece, are likely to delay any decision.
Serbia, lost its dominance over the former Yugoslavia, remains a nation of 7.5 million people with no access to the Adriatic Sea and sour relations with most of its European neighbours.
Kosovo has a poor economy and 50per cent unemployment rate but sees itself as a viable state because, with two million people, it has about the same population as Macedonia and Slovenia, bigger than Montenegro (with 620,000 people), less than Croatia (4.6million) and Bosnia (4 million).
The crucial difference is that unlike those other new nations, Kosovo was never a separate republic within Yugoslavia, instead being a part of Serbia and considered by many Serbs as the spiritual heartland of their nation.
Slovenia is the only ex-Yugoslav state to have already joined the EU and NATO and, by coincidence, it now holds the six-month rotating presidency of the union, giving it a key role in coordinating the EU response to Kosovo's declaration.

SCHENGEN ZONE ENLARGEMENT EFFECTS

The expansion of the Schengen zone, which now includes 22 EU countries, plus Norway and Iceland, will make conditions harder, for Croatian citizens, to travel around these countries using only their identity documents.
Unless they have their passports with them, Croatian citizens will need to have a special card issued to them to confirm that they are not in the EU illegally.
These special cards will be for single use only, and they will need to be stamped when Croats enter and leave the Schengen zone countries - Hungary, Italy and Slovenia.
While the expansion of the Schengen zone will complicate travel for Croats, the media in Slovenia welcomed the enlargement as a historic step towards the greater integration of Europe.
Only five current EU countries are outside the Schengen zone which was launched in 1985.
Recently-joined members Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania, which are obliged to become part of the Schengen zone, will do so when they are ready, which is expected over the next few years.
Among the older EU members, Britain and Ireland, have shown little interest in joining in the near future.

Washington and Ankara work together to combat the PKK.

During a meeting held on 5th November 2007 with Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the White House, US President George W. Bush is urging Turkey not to mount a unilateral incursion into northern Iraq and promises stronger military co-operation and intelligence-sharing to aid in the fight against the terrorist PKK.
"The PKK is an enemy of Turkey, a free Iraq, and the United States of America. And it's in our joint interest to work effectively to deal with the problem" .
Bush suggested it was not in Turkey's interest to launch a major unilateral incursion into northern Iraq, as such a move could spark confrontation with Iraqi Kurds and lead to greater instability in the region.
Instead, US President proposed reviving the three-way military mechanism among Turkey, the US and Iraq, and establishing better communication channels between top Turkish and US military officials, including the US commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus.
However, the head of the foreign affairs committee in the Turkish parliament, Murat Mercan, turned down the suggestion, saying Turkey's only counterpart is the Iraqi central government. He also accused the Iraqi Kurdish regional government of providing logistical support to the PKK.
Erdogan welcomed Bush's promise, but said his country had no plans to withdraw the estimated 100,000 troops massed on the border with Iraq. "We are not after a war, but we have a mandate from the Turkish Parliament to conduct an operation," he said.

Difficult talks on Kosovo status

The United States and most of the European Union will recognize Kosovo if the Balkan province declares independence from Serbia in early December, when last-ditch negotiations end, United States and European officials said last Monday.
The talks will end on Dec. 10. If an agreement on the province’s future will not reached between Serbia and Kosovo, Kosovo could made a unilateral declaration of independence.
According to European diplomats, while the European Union has been seeking an end to the impasse through the United Nations, it has begun losing patience with the struggle to find a consensus in the Security Council.
Mr. Putin, who wants the issue kept inside the United Nations, has opposed independence. Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, can veto or block any resolution calling for Kosovo to be independent.
Wanting to end this precarious status, the United Nations last year appointed a former president of Finland, Marti Ahtisaari, to draw up a plan in which Serbs in the province would be granted a wide degree of political and cultural autonomy once Kosovo was independent from Serbia.
The European Union agreed to closely monitor the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan by replacing the United Nations protectorate there with a strong police and judicial system in which European officials would supervise Kosovo’s independence for a certain period. NATO, which has 17,000 soldiers deployed in the province, would remain.
While the Kosovo leadership overwhelmingly accepted the Ahtisaari plan, Boris Tadic, Serbia’s president, and the Serbian prime minister, openly rejected it. Russia insisted on giving the diplomatic track another chance, which the United States and European Union accepted, but with the condition that the talks last no more than 120 days.
The Europeans appointed Wolfgang Ischinger, the German ambassador to London, to lead three envoys that includes Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko of Russia and Frank G. Wisner of the United States.

Reasons for ineffective of Israeli Palestinian Peace Plans

Till now no plan has succeeded in ending the Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. It is likely that the real problems have never been addressed by any plan. There are two intractable difficulties. The first problem is in the hearts of men. It is the tragic conviction of too many people on both sides that all of the land belongs only to them and to no-one else, and that the continued presence of the other side on the land is illegitimate and a historic injustice.
The second problem is that outside forces, especially in the Arab and Muslim world, have taken care to stir up and maintain this conviction and to arm those who will fight for it.
In addition there are several levels of "requirements" of parties to a conflict that might be conditions for resolution of that conflict. Basic requirements are those that are needed for human survival and well being: land, water, security, access to the sea if possible, a place to call your own. National requirements are those that are needed in order to survive and prosper as a nation among nation states. Freedom to pursue legitimate national goals, self determination and cultural development are among them. However, some other "requirements" are often confrontational issues, that have been developed in order to perpetuate a conflict.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict includes several such confrontational issues, that were never perceived as issues by either side until they were deliberately inflated and brought to national significance. There is no way to resolve those issues by logical formulae, because the purpose of the issue is to prevent resolution of the conflict. Essentially, the real content of each such issue is "we will make peace only when the other side admits surrender" and the issues are advanced because it is believed that the other side will never accept it and can never accept it. Therefore, the issue can be used to show that the other side does not want peace.

European deal on Reform Treaty

An agreement on the reform of the EU institutions was reached at the European Council in Brussels on 23 June. After two days of tough negotiations, EU leaders agreed on a mandate for an Intergovernmental Conference which will draw up the Reform Treaty by the end of 2007. If ratified, this treaty could enter into force in June 2009, ahead of the next elections to the European Parliament.
The EU leaders found sustainable solutions to a number of difficult issues. The new text will make the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding. The EU will have a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and a permanent president; other achievements include an increased role for national parliaments and a reduced number of Commissioners from 2014. The double majority voting system, will enter into force in 2014, with at the request of a member state a transition period allowing the current voting weights to be applied until March 2017.
Institutional reform was not the only item on the Council's agenda. Leaders welcomed Cyprus and Malta to the Eurozone, thereby paving the way for the enlargement of the euro area to 15 member states as from 1 January 2008.
The Reform Treaty is the EU's answer to the negative outcome of the French and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution two years ago. The Commission had called for a period of reflection to let national parliaments, Europeans and various parties have their say on how they see a future EU.

Presidential Change in France: new foreign policy

In the wake of his impressive electoral victory, President Nicholas Sarkozy of France will now face the challenge of keeping his campaign promises to carry out reform at home and to elaborate a new foreign policy. Sarkozy has considered the importance to attach to the European Union and in the meantime has reached out, once again, to the United States. The Middle East, in general, and Israel, in particular, are known to be on Sarkozy’s agenda.
Franco-Israeli relations have undergone many upheavals in the past. Sarkozy’s election has now raised expectations of a dramatic improvement in relations between the two countries; many in Israel have taken note of Sarkozy’s Jewish roots (his Jewish grandfather immigrated to France from Greece). However, while some improvement is indeed likely to happen, that hardly means that the new President will adopt a significant pro-Israel posture.
There is no doubt that President Sarkozy is markedly different from his predecessors.
With respect to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Sarkozy has expressed full support for Israel’s security while attaching great importance to the creation of the Palestinian state with the 1967 lines.
Concerning Lebanon and Syria, the new President shows little no signs of being bound to traditional French constraints. So if there is further convergence of French and American approaches to the Iranian nuclear question their understanding of the American dilemma in Iraq and their overall reading of the Middle Eastern strategic map, France’s desire to be an active partner in the Middle Eastern peace process could well elicit greater responsiveness by both the United States and Israel. The struggle against terrorism could also be an issue on which France and Israel might cooperate more closely although here, too, a really significant upgrading of ties would require inclusion of the United States as the third leg in a triangular relationship.
Finally, Sarkozy’s effort to breathe new life into the French economy could provide an important stimulus to enhanced technological and industrial cooperation between France and Israel. All these elements underpin the assumption of greater understanding and strategic convergence between the two countries.

NATO – Russia Council meeting on 26th April 2007

The subject meeting was part of the two-day informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo, 26-27 April.
Practical NATO-Russia cooperation, missile defence, and the CFE treaty were the three main issues discussed by Foreign Ministers at a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council.
Ministers welcomed the practical cooperation in the NATO-Russia relationship, noting in particular joint work on countering the Afghan narcotics challenge, Operation Active Endeavour, and theatre missile defence.
They also discussed strategic missile defence, specifically US discussions to base missile facilities in Europe. It was clear that, while the 26 NATO Allies believe that these US plans can in no way upset the strategic balance in Europe, Russia has fundamental concerns.
There was a consensus on the need to take this discussion forward in the NATO-Russia Council in the future, focusing in particular on threat assessment.
Finally, Allies expressed profound concerns and disquiet over President Putin's announcement, earlier on 26th April, that Russia would unilaterally suspend its adhesion to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
NATO Allies have always complied fully with the existing and adapted CFE treaties, and hope for the ratification of the adapted Treaty as soon as Russia fully meets its Istanbul commitments to withdraw personnel and equipment from Georgia and Moldova.
Again, this issue will be further discussed in the NATO-Russia Council.

The Arab Peace Initiative for Middle East

On the 28th of March 2007, the Arab League Summit was held in Riyadh/ Saudi Arabia. During the summit was discussed this question: what to do in order to promote the Arab Peace Initiative adopted in Beirut (2002)by the Arab Summit.
The significance of the Arab Peace Initiative is that it provides all interested and concerned parties with a comprehensive solution process in order to solve all the aspects of the Middle East conflict.
The significance for Israel is that it provides Israel with recognition, normalization and security guaranteed by 22 Arab countries together, provided it withdraws from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and provided it adheres to an agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem that is achieved in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
For the Palestinians it means the establishment of a Palestinian independent state based on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital.
For the Syrians it means the return of the Golan Heights.
With the impasse in the peace process, and with the failure of the gradual solutions in the last 15 years, the Arab Peace Initiative provides the alternative way-out towards comprehensive peace and reconciliation.

Serbian Parliament rejected a UN Kosovo plan

The plan was rejected by a vote of 255-15, on Wednesday 14 February. The Serbian rejection means that a resolution to the dispute over Kosovo’s final status will probably have to be imposed by the UN Security Council.
The proposal, drawn up by UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari, does not explicitly call for Kosovo’s independence, but envisions granting the province its own flag, anthem, army, constitution and the right to apply for membership in international organizations.
The plan would protect Serbian Orthodox Church sites and the Serbian language in the province. It would also grant the 200,000 Serbs, who fled Kosovo after the war, the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions.
Belgrade has offered broad autonomy for Kosovo, which it considers the medieval cradle of its statehood. But Kosovo Albanians, which account for 90 per cent of the population, demand complete secession.
The parliamentary rejection dooms hopes of a compromise between Serbian and ethnic Albanian officials at the final round of negotiations on the plan scheduled to start in Vienna, this week. There are, also, concerns the plan may trigger a showdown between the United States — long an advocate of an independent Kosovo — and Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia.

Lesson learned in Iraq

One lesson of Iraq is that it is very difficult to win a "limited war," because a "limited war" is only limited for one side. The other side may have far fewer resources, but it won't hesitate to use all of them. All they have to do is hang in there, and sooner or later, the uncommitted side is going to give up.
Sooner or later, someone will have to find a solution or get out of Iraq, at whatever cost. Perhaps, just perhaps, there is a solution, because Iraq is not like Vietnam (yet) in one very important way. In Vietnam, there was an organized government pouring resources and men into the field, supported openly by world powers. In Iraq, there is no Ho Chi Minh, and no USSR to support him. As long as the US maintains some force in Iraq, it is unlikely that insurgents could claim a victory. If that time is utilized properly, to train cadres of intelligence personnel and American administrators and liaison persons who understand their environment, then it might just be possible to win, assuming we can define what "winning" means. Intelligence personnel could infiltrate the enemy. Officers would train Iraqi army units. Administrators and liaison people could help Iraqis adminster development programs.

The almost four years that elapsed since the war should have been sufficient to start on such a program, but the US didn't try. They put their trust in the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people, and the recent White House program is still based on the vague hope that the Iraqis will overcome their sectarian differences, stop their corruption and get with the program. The Iraqis, at least those currently in charge, manifestly have different priorities and different loyalties. Without any effective local knowlege, there is no way the US could change the nature of the Iraqi government. The Iraqis are "with the program" but their programs are different from those of the US.

Saddam Hussein a symbol of Sunni resistance ?

The execution of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has set off a firestorm that is likely to inflame sectarian animosities in West Asia. For most observers in the region, Saddam's execution had little to do with legality, fairness or justice. Instead it turned out to be an emotionally charged spectacle where Iraqi Shias took revenge on a secular Sunni leader, who had ruled with an iron fist for nearly 35 years.
It is evident that Saddam's executioners were Shias, and they were apparently followers of Moqtada al-Sadr - a firebrand Shia cleric, known for his hostility towards Saddam, and the Baath party which he led.
Some of the events that followed the execution also reveal the political affiliations of those who carried out the death sentence. It has been reported that al-Sadr was presented the noose that was used to carry out the execution. Despite his attempt to distance himself from the events that preceded the hanging, few believe that the executioners would have acted so without the knowledge or sanction of a higher authority.
The video-recording of the hanging, which hit the Internet and Arab satellite stations by nightfall on December 30, has gone a long way in transforming Saddam's image. From a quarrelsome dictator, Saddam has become a symbol of Sunni resistance to foreign rule. The American occupation of Iraq as well as the proximity of the present Shia leadership to Iran has reinforced this image. A wide section of Sunnis see Saddam as a victim of plots hatched in Washington and Teheran against Sunni Arabs.

Plan for Kosovo independence

Following the press you could think that the future of Kosovo is a mystery. Will it be independent, somehow remain part of Serbia, or be divided? Will its status be decided by the end of the year and if not, when? You might conclude nothing was clear and everything was left to play for.
In fact, more has been decided about the future than ordinary Serbs and Albanians realise. Several matters are clear.
Neither the Serbs who want to stop Kosovo's Albanian majority asking independence nor the Albanians who demand it will be happy.
Furthermore, the way the situation develops over the next year remains fraught with risks. Interviews with Serbian and Albanian insiders and diplomatic sources have revealed it is now possible to predict the outline of future developments in Kosovo.
The future international mission will be similar to the model used in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995.
As for the resolution of Kosovo's final status, that is now likely to be delayed until next March. This will follow a weak UN resolution that does not mention the word "independence".Following this, Kosovo's parliament is expected to declare independence, after which some countries will recognise the new state. Others, such as Russia and Greece, will probably not start with.
The Kosovo government will not have any authority in those northern districts where Serbian government institutions will continue to operate, however.
As various countries recognise the new state, the Serbian police in the north, who today form part of the Kosovo Police Service, are expected to start taking orders from local Serbian authorities instead.
The exact details of the plan of the Kosovo status will be presented, by negotiator Martti Ahtisaari, to the UN by the end of the year.

EU Accession for Western Balkans

Croatia was the first country of the region to gain candidate status and start accession talks. But in spite of its ambitions to join the Union in 2009, its progress report finds that short-term priorities set have been only partially addressed. Judicial and administrative reforms are singled out as particularly problematic, along with widespread corruption.
Macedonia became a candidate for EU membership last December and hopes to open accession talks in 2007. But the European Commission (EC) does not believe it is ready, concluding in its report that the “pace of reforms has slowed down in 2006, and the country needs to step up its efforts”.
Serbia’s report applauds its achievement of macroeconomic stability via privatisation and foreign direct investment, but finds organised crime remains a serious problem. The EC will warn Serbia once more that failure to fully cooperate with the Hague tribunal remains a key condition for resuming talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, SAA, the first step towards EU integration.
Albania needs to focus on implementation of its SAA, which will enter into force next month. Its EC report makes plain that a good track record in implementing the agreement signed last June will be essential, “before considering any future step towards EU integration”. Albania’s priorities will remain political, judicial and economic reforms, as well as the fight against corruption and organised crime.
Montenegro, in its first progress report since gaining independence earlier this year, is found to have made some advances in tackling corruption. But the EC wants to see this widespread problem dealt with at the overall legal and institutional level, which still “presents loopholes which allow for corruption and limit the capacity of the state to effectively prevent and prosecute corruption”.
The Commission’s findings in Bosnia and Herzegovina are disappointing. It reports that progress in the troubled state towards meeting political criteria has continued at a slower pace and that key political priorities set out in its European Partnership have been “only partially addressed”.
Kosovo’s territorial limbo presents a particular challenge to the EC, which is set to report that a future status settlement needs to be clear politically, as well as legally. “The Kosovo status question is sui generis and hence sets no precedent”, reads the draft progress report, which otherwise finds very serious problems in the United Nations-administered province in terms of organised crime and its influence on various socio-economic sectors and politics.
While this year’s progress reports present a sobering picture of the Balkan transition, the EC admits that its overall enlargement strategy, saying ‘stop for now’ to potential members, is also a response to the negative feeling of EU citizens towards further expansion of the soon 27-nation bloc.

Delay to the announcement of Kosovo's final status

On October 9, Martti Ahtisaari, the UN special envoy for Kosovo, admitted no agreed solution was in sight in ongoing talks on final status.
In fact, the gap is widening, as the Albanian majority clamours for independence as soon as possible, while Serbs up the stakes, using their constitution as a diplomatic weapon.
On September 30, Serbia's parliament narrowed the chances of future compromise by adopting a draft constitution that describes Kosovo as an indivisible part of the republic's territory.
At the same time, Serb officials have put pressure on the international community not to make any pronouncement on Kosovo's final status before Serbia's next parliamentary elections, expected in December.
Belgrade foreseen that an announcement of final status will be postponed until next year.
Though politicians in Kosovo continue to insist final status question will be resolved this year, with some predicting that frustration may spill over into violence. But many political analysts admit this looks unlikely.
Negotiations on final status opened in Vienna in February under Ahtisaari's auspices, six years after the international community took over administration of the territory from Serbia.
But the talks failed to agree on any substantial points.
The so-called Contact Group of big powers on Kosovo has authorised Ahtisaari to prepare a document on final status, in the meantime urging him to continue negotiations on the "technical" issues.
In the absence of wider agreement, this document is to contain Ahtisaari's personal opinion on the status question, after which a solution may be imposed on both sides.

RECONCILIATION OF THE BALKANS IS AN AIM OF THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL?

The Hague tribunal was established in 1993 with the aim of bringing to justice those responsible for the horrors that was sweeping through the Balkans at the start of the decade. Bosnia and Croatia were both still submerged in violence at the time, and there was a sense that something needed to be done in the evidence of widespread, systematic ethnic cleansing.

Today, the violence is over but the Balkans remains very much divided.Bosnia’s state system, which emerged from the peace accords that brought an end to the war there, splits the country into two ethnically-defined entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska. At the same time, the federal government in Sarajevo is busy suing neighbouring Serbia for its role in the Bosnian war, in a case in which billions of dollars in reparations payments could be at stake.

Serbia, for its part, has been blocked from closer relations with the European Union over its apparent reluctance to square up to the Hague court’s the former Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic, who along with indicted ex-Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic, are still regarded by a significant proportion of Serbia’s population as heroes.

Amid all this, it is widely hoped that the ICTY have also a role to play beyond simply dispensing criminal justice: to reconcile the peoples of the Balkans with their violent recent history.

Political and economic cooperation between Serbia and Croatia is improving after war for independence.

Recently Croatia's authorities joined Serbian president Boris Tadic for a celebration of the 150th anniversary of Tesla's birth, the scientist born in the village of Smiljani , in Croatia 's Lika region. That meeting is a signal of renewed relations between Croatia and Serbia.
The two countries relations reached boiling point so many times that the future can only bring about a long period of gradual cooling off.
In fact, political ties between Zagreb and Belgrade have been warming steadily since Croatia 's war for independence from the former Yugoslavia ended ten years ago.
Today the two states have already established a high level of official cooperation. Citizens of both countries can travel across their borders without visas. As a result, Croatia 's Adriatic coast has again become a popular destination for Serbian holidaymakers - those who can afford the greatly increased prices.
The Croatia’s relations are now better with Serbia than they are with Slovenia, it is probably because in peace time they were always closer to the Serbs and because Croats dislike Slovenes. There is an ongoing dispute between the two Adriatic powers (Croatia and Slovenia) over their frontiers in the waters off the coast of the region of Istria .
Croatia and Serbia have rebuilt respectable economic ties since the war. Croatia's trade with Serbia has more than doubled over the past two years, with exports soaring from 172 million US dollars in 2003 to 400 dollars million last year and imports recording similar growth levels.
On July 21, the Croatian Prime minister Ivo Sanader and his Serbian opposite number, Vojislav Kostunica, has met to open a new border crossing in Bajakovo. The opening follows the reconstruction and completion of Croatia 's section of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway, which was halted by the war.

Macedonia: new coalition government lead by Gruevski (VMRO-DPMNE)

Macedonians handed power to the right-wing VMRO DPMNE in the elections held on July 5th, seen as largely fair and democratic. The VMRO DMPNE leader, Nikola Gruevski, promised to revive the impoverished economy and fight corruption.
But Gruevski may face difficulties ahead in carrying out his programme, due to the fact that he would not enjoy a clear majority in the 120-seat parliament, meaning the party will require coalition partners.
Political analysts are divided over who will be the new government's partner from among the country's large Albanian community. Most agree the new coalition will also be more fragile than previous governments.
The State Election Commission report that only 56.15 per cent of the 1.7 million voters turned out: VMRO DPMNE won 32.46 per cent of cast votes, against 23.31 per cent for the incumbent Social Democrats, SDSM. The New Socials Democrats, NSDP, a splinter party from the SDSM, took 6.1 per cent, while VMRO Narodna, led by the former prime minister, Ljupco Georgievski, gained 6.12 per cent.
Among Albanian parties, the party of former rebels in the 2001 insurgency, the Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, won 12.24 per cent, while their opponents, the Democratic Party of Albanians, DPA, took 7.5 per cent.
A major question is whether VMRO DPMNE will stick to its previous Albanian partner, the DPA, or offer an alliance to the DUI, which won far more Albanian votes and has been the partner of the Social Democrats over the past four years.
However, VMRO DPMNE will still need another Macedonian partner if it is to have a stable coalition.
The main candidates for such a coalition are the VMRO NP party of former hard line nationalist Ljupco Georgievski and the NSDP, a splinter leftist party of former Social Democrat Tito Petkovski.
VMRO DPMNE was now entering a long period of tough negotiations to form a government.