Lesson learned in Iraq

One lesson of Iraq is that it is very difficult to win a "limited war," because a "limited war" is only limited for one side. The other side may have far fewer resources, but it won't hesitate to use all of them. All they have to do is hang in there, and sooner or later, the uncommitted side is going to give up.
Sooner or later, someone will have to find a solution or get out of Iraq, at whatever cost. Perhaps, just perhaps, there is a solution, because Iraq is not like Vietnam (yet) in one very important way. In Vietnam, there was an organized government pouring resources and men into the field, supported openly by world powers. In Iraq, there is no Ho Chi Minh, and no USSR to support him. As long as the US maintains some force in Iraq, it is unlikely that insurgents could claim a victory. If that time is utilized properly, to train cadres of intelligence personnel and American administrators and liaison persons who understand their environment, then it might just be possible to win, assuming we can define what "winning" means. Intelligence personnel could infiltrate the enemy. Officers would train Iraqi army units. Administrators and liaison people could help Iraqis adminster development programs.

The almost four years that elapsed since the war should have been sufficient to start on such a program, but the US didn't try. They put their trust in the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people, and the recent White House program is still based on the vague hope that the Iraqis will overcome their sectarian differences, stop their corruption and get with the program. The Iraqis, at least those currently in charge, manifestly have different priorities and different loyalties. Without any effective local knowlege, there is no way the US could change the nature of the Iraqi government. The Iraqis are "with the program" but their programs are different from those of the US.

Saddam Hussein a symbol of Sunni resistance ?

The execution of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has set off a firestorm that is likely to inflame sectarian animosities in West Asia. For most observers in the region, Saddam's execution had little to do with legality, fairness or justice. Instead it turned out to be an emotionally charged spectacle where Iraqi Shias took revenge on a secular Sunni leader, who had ruled with an iron fist for nearly 35 years.
It is evident that Saddam's executioners were Shias, and they were apparently followers of Moqtada al-Sadr - a firebrand Shia cleric, known for his hostility towards Saddam, and the Baath party which he led.
Some of the events that followed the execution also reveal the political affiliations of those who carried out the death sentence. It has been reported that al-Sadr was presented the noose that was used to carry out the execution. Despite his attempt to distance himself from the events that preceded the hanging, few believe that the executioners would have acted so without the knowledge or sanction of a higher authority.
The video-recording of the hanging, which hit the Internet and Arab satellite stations by nightfall on December 30, has gone a long way in transforming Saddam's image. From a quarrelsome dictator, Saddam has become a symbol of Sunni resistance to foreign rule. The American occupation of Iraq as well as the proximity of the present Shia leadership to Iran has reinforced this image. A wide section of Sunnis see Saddam as a victim of plots hatched in Washington and Teheran against Sunni Arabs.