SCHENGEN ZONE ENLARGEMENT EFFECTS

The expansion of the Schengen zone, which now includes 22 EU countries, plus Norway and Iceland, will make conditions harder, for Croatian citizens, to travel around these countries using only their identity documents.
Unless they have their passports with them, Croatian citizens will need to have a special card issued to them to confirm that they are not in the EU illegally.
These special cards will be for single use only, and they will need to be stamped when Croats enter and leave the Schengen zone countries - Hungary, Italy and Slovenia.
While the expansion of the Schengen zone will complicate travel for Croats, the media in Slovenia welcomed the enlargement as a historic step towards the greater integration of Europe.
Only five current EU countries are outside the Schengen zone which was launched in 1985.
Recently-joined members Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania, which are obliged to become part of the Schengen zone, will do so when they are ready, which is expected over the next few years.
Among the older EU members, Britain and Ireland, have shown little interest in joining in the near future.

Washington and Ankara work together to combat the PKK.

During a meeting held on 5th November 2007 with Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the White House, US President George W. Bush is urging Turkey not to mount a unilateral incursion into northern Iraq and promises stronger military co-operation and intelligence-sharing to aid in the fight against the terrorist PKK.
"The PKK is an enemy of Turkey, a free Iraq, and the United States of America. And it's in our joint interest to work effectively to deal with the problem" .
Bush suggested it was not in Turkey's interest to launch a major unilateral incursion into northern Iraq, as such a move could spark confrontation with Iraqi Kurds and lead to greater instability in the region.
Instead, US President proposed reviving the three-way military mechanism among Turkey, the US and Iraq, and establishing better communication channels between top Turkish and US military officials, including the US commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus.
However, the head of the foreign affairs committee in the Turkish parliament, Murat Mercan, turned down the suggestion, saying Turkey's only counterpart is the Iraqi central government. He also accused the Iraqi Kurdish regional government of providing logistical support to the PKK.
Erdogan welcomed Bush's promise, but said his country had no plans to withdraw the estimated 100,000 troops massed on the border with Iraq. "We are not after a war, but we have a mandate from the Turkish Parliament to conduct an operation," he said.

Difficult talks on Kosovo status

The United States and most of the European Union will recognize Kosovo if the Balkan province declares independence from Serbia in early December, when last-ditch negotiations end, United States and European officials said last Monday.
The talks will end on Dec. 10. If an agreement on the province’s future will not reached between Serbia and Kosovo, Kosovo could made a unilateral declaration of independence.
According to European diplomats, while the European Union has been seeking an end to the impasse through the United Nations, it has begun losing patience with the struggle to find a consensus in the Security Council.
Mr. Putin, who wants the issue kept inside the United Nations, has opposed independence. Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, can veto or block any resolution calling for Kosovo to be independent.
Wanting to end this precarious status, the United Nations last year appointed a former president of Finland, Marti Ahtisaari, to draw up a plan in which Serbs in the province would be granted a wide degree of political and cultural autonomy once Kosovo was independent from Serbia.
The European Union agreed to closely monitor the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan by replacing the United Nations protectorate there with a strong police and judicial system in which European officials would supervise Kosovo’s independence for a certain period. NATO, which has 17,000 soldiers deployed in the province, would remain.
While the Kosovo leadership overwhelmingly accepted the Ahtisaari plan, Boris Tadic, Serbia’s president, and the Serbian prime minister, openly rejected it. Russia insisted on giving the diplomatic track another chance, which the United States and European Union accepted, but with the condition that the talks last no more than 120 days.
The Europeans appointed Wolfgang Ischinger, the German ambassador to London, to lead three envoys that includes Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko of Russia and Frank G. Wisner of the United States.

Reasons for ineffective of Israeli Palestinian Peace Plans

Till now no plan has succeeded in ending the Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. It is likely that the real problems have never been addressed by any plan. There are two intractable difficulties. The first problem is in the hearts of men. It is the tragic conviction of too many people on both sides that all of the land belongs only to them and to no-one else, and that the continued presence of the other side on the land is illegitimate and a historic injustice.
The second problem is that outside forces, especially in the Arab and Muslim world, have taken care to stir up and maintain this conviction and to arm those who will fight for it.
In addition there are several levels of "requirements" of parties to a conflict that might be conditions for resolution of that conflict. Basic requirements are those that are needed for human survival and well being: land, water, security, access to the sea if possible, a place to call your own. National requirements are those that are needed in order to survive and prosper as a nation among nation states. Freedom to pursue legitimate national goals, self determination and cultural development are among them. However, some other "requirements" are often confrontational issues, that have been developed in order to perpetuate a conflict.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict includes several such confrontational issues, that were never perceived as issues by either side until they were deliberately inflated and brought to national significance. There is no way to resolve those issues by logical formulae, because the purpose of the issue is to prevent resolution of the conflict. Essentially, the real content of each such issue is "we will make peace only when the other side admits surrender" and the issues are advanced because it is believed that the other side will never accept it and can never accept it. Therefore, the issue can be used to show that the other side does not want peace.

European deal on Reform Treaty

An agreement on the reform of the EU institutions was reached at the European Council in Brussels on 23 June. After two days of tough negotiations, EU leaders agreed on a mandate for an Intergovernmental Conference which will draw up the Reform Treaty by the end of 2007. If ratified, this treaty could enter into force in June 2009, ahead of the next elections to the European Parliament.
The EU leaders found sustainable solutions to a number of difficult issues. The new text will make the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding. The EU will have a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and a permanent president; other achievements include an increased role for national parliaments and a reduced number of Commissioners from 2014. The double majority voting system, will enter into force in 2014, with at the request of a member state a transition period allowing the current voting weights to be applied until March 2017.
Institutional reform was not the only item on the Council's agenda. Leaders welcomed Cyprus and Malta to the Eurozone, thereby paving the way for the enlargement of the euro area to 15 member states as from 1 January 2008.
The Reform Treaty is the EU's answer to the negative outcome of the French and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution two years ago. The Commission had called for a period of reflection to let national parliaments, Europeans and various parties have their say on how they see a future EU.

Presidential Change in France: new foreign policy

In the wake of his impressive electoral victory, President Nicholas Sarkozy of France will now face the challenge of keeping his campaign promises to carry out reform at home and to elaborate a new foreign policy. Sarkozy has considered the importance to attach to the European Union and in the meantime has reached out, once again, to the United States. The Middle East, in general, and Israel, in particular, are known to be on Sarkozy’s agenda.
Franco-Israeli relations have undergone many upheavals in the past. Sarkozy’s election has now raised expectations of a dramatic improvement in relations between the two countries; many in Israel have taken note of Sarkozy’s Jewish roots (his Jewish grandfather immigrated to France from Greece). However, while some improvement is indeed likely to happen, that hardly means that the new President will adopt a significant pro-Israel posture.
There is no doubt that President Sarkozy is markedly different from his predecessors.
With respect to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Sarkozy has expressed full support for Israel’s security while attaching great importance to the creation of the Palestinian state with the 1967 lines.
Concerning Lebanon and Syria, the new President shows little no signs of being bound to traditional French constraints. So if there is further convergence of French and American approaches to the Iranian nuclear question their understanding of the American dilemma in Iraq and their overall reading of the Middle Eastern strategic map, France’s desire to be an active partner in the Middle Eastern peace process could well elicit greater responsiveness by both the United States and Israel. The struggle against terrorism could also be an issue on which France and Israel might cooperate more closely although here, too, a really significant upgrading of ties would require inclusion of the United States as the third leg in a triangular relationship.
Finally, Sarkozy’s effort to breathe new life into the French economy could provide an important stimulus to enhanced technological and industrial cooperation between France and Israel. All these elements underpin the assumption of greater understanding and strategic convergence between the two countries.

NATO – Russia Council meeting on 26th April 2007

The subject meeting was part of the two-day informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo, 26-27 April.
Practical NATO-Russia cooperation, missile defence, and the CFE treaty were the three main issues discussed by Foreign Ministers at a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council.
Ministers welcomed the practical cooperation in the NATO-Russia relationship, noting in particular joint work on countering the Afghan narcotics challenge, Operation Active Endeavour, and theatre missile defence.
They also discussed strategic missile defence, specifically US discussions to base missile facilities in Europe. It was clear that, while the 26 NATO Allies believe that these US plans can in no way upset the strategic balance in Europe, Russia has fundamental concerns.
There was a consensus on the need to take this discussion forward in the NATO-Russia Council in the future, focusing in particular on threat assessment.
Finally, Allies expressed profound concerns and disquiet over President Putin's announcement, earlier on 26th April, that Russia would unilaterally suspend its adhesion to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
NATO Allies have always complied fully with the existing and adapted CFE treaties, and hope for the ratification of the adapted Treaty as soon as Russia fully meets its Istanbul commitments to withdraw personnel and equipment from Georgia and Moldova.
Again, this issue will be further discussed in the NATO-Russia Council.

The Arab Peace Initiative for Middle East

On the 28th of March 2007, the Arab League Summit was held in Riyadh/ Saudi Arabia. During the summit was discussed this question: what to do in order to promote the Arab Peace Initiative adopted in Beirut (2002)by the Arab Summit.
The significance of the Arab Peace Initiative is that it provides all interested and concerned parties with a comprehensive solution process in order to solve all the aspects of the Middle East conflict.
The significance for Israel is that it provides Israel with recognition, normalization and security guaranteed by 22 Arab countries together, provided it withdraws from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and provided it adheres to an agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem that is achieved in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
For the Palestinians it means the establishment of a Palestinian independent state based on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital.
For the Syrians it means the return of the Golan Heights.
With the impasse in the peace process, and with the failure of the gradual solutions in the last 15 years, the Arab Peace Initiative provides the alternative way-out towards comprehensive peace and reconciliation.

Serbian Parliament rejected a UN Kosovo plan

The plan was rejected by a vote of 255-15, on Wednesday 14 February. The Serbian rejection means that a resolution to the dispute over Kosovo’s final status will probably have to be imposed by the UN Security Council.
The proposal, drawn up by UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari, does not explicitly call for Kosovo’s independence, but envisions granting the province its own flag, anthem, army, constitution and the right to apply for membership in international organizations.
The plan would protect Serbian Orthodox Church sites and the Serbian language in the province. It would also grant the 200,000 Serbs, who fled Kosovo after the war, the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions.
Belgrade has offered broad autonomy for Kosovo, which it considers the medieval cradle of its statehood. But Kosovo Albanians, which account for 90 per cent of the population, demand complete secession.
The parliamentary rejection dooms hopes of a compromise between Serbian and ethnic Albanian officials at the final round of negotiations on the plan scheduled to start in Vienna, this week. There are, also, concerns the plan may trigger a showdown between the United States — long an advocate of an independent Kosovo — and Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia.

Lesson learned in Iraq

One lesson of Iraq is that it is very difficult to win a "limited war," because a "limited war" is only limited for one side. The other side may have far fewer resources, but it won't hesitate to use all of them. All they have to do is hang in there, and sooner or later, the uncommitted side is going to give up.
Sooner or later, someone will have to find a solution or get out of Iraq, at whatever cost. Perhaps, just perhaps, there is a solution, because Iraq is not like Vietnam (yet) in one very important way. In Vietnam, there was an organized government pouring resources and men into the field, supported openly by world powers. In Iraq, there is no Ho Chi Minh, and no USSR to support him. As long as the US maintains some force in Iraq, it is unlikely that insurgents could claim a victory. If that time is utilized properly, to train cadres of intelligence personnel and American administrators and liaison persons who understand their environment, then it might just be possible to win, assuming we can define what "winning" means. Intelligence personnel could infiltrate the enemy. Officers would train Iraqi army units. Administrators and liaison people could help Iraqis adminster development programs.

The almost four years that elapsed since the war should have been sufficient to start on such a program, but the US didn't try. They put their trust in the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people, and the recent White House program is still based on the vague hope that the Iraqis will overcome their sectarian differences, stop their corruption and get with the program. The Iraqis, at least those currently in charge, manifestly have different priorities and different loyalties. Without any effective local knowlege, there is no way the US could change the nature of the Iraqi government. The Iraqis are "with the program" but their programs are different from those of the US.

Saddam Hussein a symbol of Sunni resistance ?

The execution of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has set off a firestorm that is likely to inflame sectarian animosities in West Asia. For most observers in the region, Saddam's execution had little to do with legality, fairness or justice. Instead it turned out to be an emotionally charged spectacle where Iraqi Shias took revenge on a secular Sunni leader, who had ruled with an iron fist for nearly 35 years.
It is evident that Saddam's executioners were Shias, and they were apparently followers of Moqtada al-Sadr - a firebrand Shia cleric, known for his hostility towards Saddam, and the Baath party which he led.
Some of the events that followed the execution also reveal the political affiliations of those who carried out the death sentence. It has been reported that al-Sadr was presented the noose that was used to carry out the execution. Despite his attempt to distance himself from the events that preceded the hanging, few believe that the executioners would have acted so without the knowledge or sanction of a higher authority.
The video-recording of the hanging, which hit the Internet and Arab satellite stations by nightfall on December 30, has gone a long way in transforming Saddam's image. From a quarrelsome dictator, Saddam has become a symbol of Sunni resistance to foreign rule. The American occupation of Iraq as well as the proximity of the present Shia leadership to Iran has reinforced this image. A wide section of Sunnis see Saddam as a victim of plots hatched in Washington and Teheran against Sunni Arabs.