Lesson learned in Iraq

One lesson of Iraq is that it is very difficult to win a "limited war," because a "limited war" is only limited for one side. The other side may have far fewer resources, but it won't hesitate to use all of them. All they have to do is hang in there, and sooner or later, the uncommitted side is going to give up.
Sooner or later, someone will have to find a solution or get out of Iraq, at whatever cost. Perhaps, just perhaps, there is a solution, because Iraq is not like Vietnam (yet) in one very important way. In Vietnam, there was an organized government pouring resources and men into the field, supported openly by world powers. In Iraq, there is no Ho Chi Minh, and no USSR to support him. As long as the US maintains some force in Iraq, it is unlikely that insurgents could claim a victory. If that time is utilized properly, to train cadres of intelligence personnel and American administrators and liaison persons who understand their environment, then it might just be possible to win, assuming we can define what "winning" means. Intelligence personnel could infiltrate the enemy. Officers would train Iraqi army units. Administrators and liaison people could help Iraqis adminster development programs.

The almost four years that elapsed since the war should have been sufficient to start on such a program, but the US didn't try. They put their trust in the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people, and the recent White House program is still based on the vague hope that the Iraqis will overcome their sectarian differences, stop their corruption and get with the program. The Iraqis, at least those currently in charge, manifestly have different priorities and different loyalties. Without any effective local knowlege, there is no way the US could change the nature of the Iraqi government. The Iraqis are "with the program" but their programs are different from those of the US.