The difficult road of Serbia and Montenegro to Euro-Atlantic integration

The persistent strength of the nationalism in the Union continues to compromise the reform process in Serbia and Montenegro, and leaves minorities intimidated and overlooked.
The status of Kosovo threatens increased tensions in South Serbia, whose majority Albanian population wants the region taken into consideration in the negotiation process. Also, relations between Bosniak and Serbian communities are under strain in Sandzak, a majority-Muslim area straddling Serbia and Montenegro. If the referendum for division of the Union in two States will succeed, the region of Sandzak will be cut in half.

The northern province of Vojvodina, long held up as an example of inter-ethnic harmony, has seen in recent times frequent confrontations involving ethnic Hungarians, Croats and Serbs. Roma continue to face widespread discrimination throughout Serbia and Montenegro Union.
The more general exclusion of minorities is reflected in the Serbian parliament, where no minority party has managed to secure representation. The handful of minority MPs belong to mainstream parties, which do not prioritise minority issues.
Serbian radical and nationalist groups are increasingly active in universities. Their doctrine combines a return to the values of the Serbian Orthodox Church, with animosity towards non-Serbian ethnic groups.
Serbia and Montenegro will have difficulty achieving full Euro-Atlantic integration in such an environment.

Export is crucial for Kossovo.

As Kosovo enters the final status talks in Vienna, that Albanians hope will end in independence, concern is focusing increasingly on what the two million or habitants will live on in future. Though local officials claim Kosovo has the potential to export many items, such as coal and wine, in practice it barely exports anything, placing a question mark over its long term economic viability. Goods export is decreasing and the decline has not yet reached its conclusion.

UNMIK, which handles the economy, said, "Given its natural resources, Kosovo could export minerals competitively, such as coal, lead, zinc,nickel and magnesium. It also has the potential for large-scaleproduction and export of electricity.With its young and abundant labour force, Kosovo could also potentially produce textiles and footwear. But Kosovo should adopt policies that encourage investment into new types of activities".

For the moment these remain dreams rather than reality and even the most optimistic local economists know that any revival will be a long-term project.

Muhamet Mustafa, head of Riinvest, a non-profit research and policy development institute, agreed that Kosovo's export potential was not a lost cause. "The goods we exported in the past, such as lead, electricity and wine, are a potential sector for revival after privatisation and technological updates," he said."Small and medium-sized enterprises could lead the way in kick-starting exports, as they had already proven their expertise in fields such as fruit juice and other food stuffs" he added. But other experts warn that there will be no easy revival of theterritory's former industries, such as wine production.

Moreover, Kosovo's pre-war industries did not have to compete in the European market but lived off sales to Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo was then a part. Kujtim Dobruna, director of the Vienna-based Economic Initiative for Kosovo, points out that Kosovo has not even reached first base in the business of certification - an essential requirement for any exporter to the European Union. Kosovo producers have to concentrate on building up weak production capacity and fill the gap in the domestic market before trying to venture abroad. As far as western markets are concerned, the main obstacle ist he lack of knowledge among local entrepreneurs, while the government offers them only limited support

Changes in the Army of the Union Serbia and Montenegro

The former Jugoslavian Army (VJ)was renamed the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, VSCG, after the signing of the StateUnion Constitutional Charter on March 14, 2002. With Pavkovic gone, the first genuine reforms in the military took place under Boris Tadic, who became the state union's defence minister in March 2003.
The army has downsized in personnel and facilities. Surplusweapons were destroyed, and tactical and technical reforms enacted. Tadic's reforms aimed to cement civilian oversight of the army,with the creation of new mechanisms to ensure civilian control and democratic accountability. The State Union Ministerial Council, consisting of the two republics' presidents, the president of the state union and defence minister, assumed the role of supreme commander, while the general staff was subordinated to the ministry of defence, headed by a civilian. Parliament now exercised clear supervision of the work of the defence ministry and the army by parliamentary committee, while a separate commission was set up to monitor military intelligence. However, since 2003 the reforms have run into the sand, defeated by Montenegro's indifference, which has rendered further efforts pointless. The increasingly unclear relationship between the two republics has opened up new room for political manoeuvring within the army, especially by conservative forces opposed to cooperation with The Hague tribunal. They are leading the action to block the passage of laws aimed at further regulating control of the armed forces and enforcing transparency in the army budget.

Adriatic Chart Countries and NATO

American officials said the three countries had made goodprogress towards meeting NATO standards.But Nicholas Burns, the State Department's third most senior official, added that they needed to do more to strengthen democracy and fight corruption.
Burns added that NATO knows Albania, Croatia and Macedonia want to join as soon as possible, but said the alliance had not set adefinite date for them to become members.NATO officials have regularly dodged questions about whether 2008 was a firm target for the three countries to join thealliance. NATO's Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, inJanuary restated that the door remains open for new members, but he refused to discuss possible entry dates.
NATO officials point out that membership is not important solelyin providing military security but in cementing a member state'soverall political and social stability. Membership obliges states to respect political and economic standards, including free and fair elections and the rule of law, and to combat organised crime and corruption and build up government structures underpinned by viable tax and customsrevenues. Measured against those criteria, NATO officials admit Tirana still has some work to do. The country has made progress on the military side, for example, but has not yet transformed the armed forces from a communist-style conscript army to a professional force, which can be harmonised with NATO.
In 2008 the NATO Summit will be held and Albania expects an invitation to membership.What Albania needs to do to join NATO has been spelled out on many occasions and the Albanians have been given a fair amount of assistance to achieve those ends. Albania needed to work harder on the rule of law and combating corruption, in particular, to show it is really capable of assuming the responsibilities of NATO membership.Many people in Albania do not seem to understand that this [NATO membership] entails responsibilities as well as a protective umbrella. However, the foreign ministers of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia said in Washington that they had fully grasped this point. Neven Mimica, chair of the Croatian parliament's integration commission, said in Tirana earlier this month that it was still realistic to hope all three could join in 2008. NATO membership was a milestone on the way to meeting another major goal for the three countries, namely membership of the EU.

Milosevic indictment and death

Slobodan Milosevic was not only the most notorious official of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, but also the only top Serbianor Yugoslav political and military leader to be indicted by theInternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for crimes carried out in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995.
This decision had more to do with politics than justice: it would appear that Del Ponte found the resistance to the ICTY of Serbia's post-Milosevic regime - too tough to risk a further round of indictments of topofficials.
This had nothing to do with an absence of available evidence.
Kadijevic, Adzic, Jovic, Kostic and others could all have been indicted on the basis of their command responsibility for crimes carried out by their JNA subordinates at Vukovar and Dubrovnik, indictments for which already existed. Indeed, while Del Ponte was ready to indict the Croatian Army'schief of staff, Janko Bobetko, for crimes carried out by his subordinates at the Medak Pocket, and to indict the commander ofthe Bosnian Army, Rasim Delic, for crimes carried out by mujahedin fighters in Central Bosnia - in both cases on thebasis of command responsibility - she was unwilling to indict the top JNA commanders and members of the rump Yugoslav presidency on the same basis. She skewed her indictments in favour of the aggressors who conquered large areas of Croatia and Bosnia, and at the expense of those defending their countries from the aggression.